The SNP’s control freakery is a barrier to public sector reform

The 2011 report of the Commission on the Future Delivery of Public Services (Christie Commission) has been frequently referenced but little heeded. There will, no doubt, be a spike in references following John Swinney’s speech on “national renewal”. Whether it finally leads to the kind of action called for back in 2011 is far from certain.

The Commission was set up on the recommendation of the 2010 Independent Budget Review (IBR) report, a report that deserved far more attention than it was given. Our public finances would be in a far healthier state than at present had the IBR been heeded.

First Minister Alex Salmond, accompanied by senior officials, called a meeting in Bute House with Campbell Christie, retired general secretary of the STUC, and myself to discuss the remit and membership of the Commission on public service delivery, having gained our agreement to participate. Salmond led the discussion and was clear that the remit was broad and there would be no interference from within his government. The next time we met Salmond, accompanied by one of his special advisers, was in his office in Holyrood shortly after the report’s completion.

Evidence was taken from a wide range of sources over the course of the inquiry. We were encouraged to be bold – there was considerable agreement on this across the political spectrum as well as amongst those responsible for delivering services. Various other reports and inquiries were produced around this time that chimed with the work of the Christie Commission.

Former health minister Susan Deacon’s report Joining the Dots on early years included a memorable and important observation, “We have masses of research and evidence and heaps of good practice. We don’t need to invent or discover any of this, we need to work together to connect it up – in short, ‘to join the dots’”.  The McClelland review of public sector information and communication technology was another important work from this time. It called for more work to reduce fragmentation and duplication of ICT services across the public sector.  Plus ça change…  Peter Hennessy, the great scholar of Whitehall, has often noted the lack of institutional memory across UK Government departments. The same is true of the Scottish Government.

It is, however, strange to see the first minister refer to the creation of Police Scotland as an example of the Christie report. That reform, along with the creation of the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, was well underway by the time Christie was deliberating. These were bold reforms that resulted in savings but there is little evidence that the Scottish Government learned lessons from these bold changes, despite commissioning appraisals of the reform.

The challenges involved, governance structures to be created around these services and disruption seem to have put off any prospect of anything quite as bold. Instead, we have had the performative blind alley of the National Care Service and broken promises on the desperately needed radical change in central-local relations with the Verity House Agreement. Even now, we have the first minister reportedly hinting that a further round of council tax freeze – the very antithesis of Christie – might happen.

The Christie report offered nothing new but gave an overview that provided a direction of travel. It could not and should not have offered a detailed blueprint. It could not, given the tight timescale – it was appointed in late 2010 and expected to report early the next summer. No Commission should attempt to provide the detailed application of reform which must involve those who actually deliver services and recognise the variety of ways of achieving the same goals. There were then, as ever, many examples of good practice.

The fundamental question was and remains – if everyone agrees on the need for change and in particular the Christie critique then why has it not happened?

The critique and formulation of responses of existing service delivery followed well-rehearsed arguments.  Services were too often bureaucratic, impersonal and paid insufficient attention to local conditions and communities. Far too little effort went into prevention. As a former health minister once remarked, “we are great at putting bodies back together that fall off a cliff but hopeless at stopping them fall in the first place”. 

Christie referred to an estimate that 40 per cent of all public service spending was accounted for by interventions that could have been avoided by prioritising prevention. That suspiciously round figure was unlikely to be accurate but what must be true is that the proportion, whatever it is, will have grown due to the absence of the ‘radical shift towards preventative spending’ the Commission considered essential.

Our services operated in silos. We still have citizens and families who are shunted from person to person, service to service like balls in a bagatelle. The quality of service received is determined too often more by chance than efficiencies. The fault lies not with those at the inter-face with the public, the people who actually deliver the services who, it was obvious then as now, more often work tirelessly but are undermined by poor systems, top-down policy making, and far too much focus on imagery and communication as well as innovation for innovation’s sake.

Swinney, as public service minister, made frequent speeches in the aftermath of the report’s publication, complaining at the lack of pace and scale of change. In his recent speech, he once more bemoans the lack of progress. What responsibility does he accept?

His approach has been to admonish and blame others for reform failures instead of considering the impediments, incentive structures, the deeply ingrained pervasive attitudes that stood in the way of reform and, crucially, the role of the Scottish Government in undermining effective delivery of services.

He states that barriers need to be navigated. Enabling change slips easily of ministerial tongues. Central control freakery has been a hallmark of this government. Negotiating barriers is not what is needed. Removing barriers is required but this cannot be done when ministers are themselves often the barriers. Appointing a couple of junior ministers to lead on reform is all very well. But one is retiring next May. The other is widely respected and would be in the Cabinet if competence was the key criteria for advancement. But the recent reshuffle speaks of continuity and that will not work.

It is, of course, valid to note the impact of external factors making service delivery more challenging. It is, however, remiss not to assume the possibility of external shocks and alter course accordingly. If you set yourself a time to arrive at a destination and it turns out that the route proves more challenging due to unanticipated problems, you change gears and put in more effort. Simply maintaining that the failure to arrive is all down to some unanticipated obstruction is a dereliction of duty.

Government involves dealing with crises, unanticipated events, limited and often poor evidence of what works, difficult decisions, trade-offs and partnership. Governing is never a smooth conveyor belt from a first ministerial speech to improved outcomes.

The problem has been that when the Scottish Government has responded positively to reports, it has tended to assume it can tick the box as job done rather than appreciate that many jobs are never completed. The emphasis on early years was welcome but there is little appreciation inside government, despite evidence, that any good deriving from early intervention is dissipated without follow-up. This tick-box tendency undermines much good work. 

And then there is the kind of response to Christie – sprinkling references to the report, its themes and language into ministerial speeches as a substitute for action.  The first minister’s speech writer is fluent in the language of public service reform but incoherent in delivery.

Innovation for its own sake, the establishment of another inquiry, appointment of a new body of advisers, strategy documents and report piling up to create a mountain of data surrounding a vacuum of activity have become standard operating procedures. The challenges have mounted – but not only because of the pandemic and Brexit, the time and effort devoted to the independence referendum – but centralisation, uniformism and top-down decision-making with far too little autonomy given to those with real expertise has exacerbated problems.