After years of false promises, the SNP still has no route to a referendum

Nothing divides the SNP more than debate on how to secure independence. Other issues cause problems, divisions and internal ructions for a period but divisions on strategy and tactics persist.

Half a century ago, after heated debate, the SNP decided that it would be “prepared to accept an assembly with limited powers as a possible stepping stone” to independence. The slim devolution majority in the 1979 referendum combined with losing nine of the party’s eleven MPs led to another heated debate. There should be no more blind alleys, critics insisted. The SNP decided against “dealings in assemblies, devolution, or meaningful talks”. Except there have been blind alleys aplenty over the years.

Support for devolution in the 1997 referendum came after years of argument.  After the establishment of the Scottish Parliament many nationalists believed that the bitter battles over tactics and strategy were over. “We are all fundamentalists now,” explained one senior member. But key issues were never resolved. What was the process of achieving independence?  What constituted a mandate for independence?

The 2014 independence referendum had been conceded by a prime minister convinced that an easy victory for the union would devastate the SNP. David Cameron’s error has hardened opposition to another referendum in Westminster. Nicola Sturgeon had no idea how to respond and only raised expectations time and again, leaving a frustrated party in her wake.

John Swinney inherited leadership of a party looking for strategic clarity after years of false promises. He will hope the imminence of next May’s election will encourage unity around the resolution in his name at this year’s SNP conference.

A variety of ideas have been dumped into this resolution – an election fought on a “clear platform of national independence”; independence through an “agreed, democratic, constitutional and legal process”; a “national referendum”; a “mandate that cannot be contested or rejected”; a “target” of the 2011 overall majority; a Scottish Constitutional Convention to “marshal support for Scotland’s democratic right to decide”; a broad-based and inclusive campaign. There is something in it for every SNP delegate, except clarity. It is designed to appease activists rather than set out a coherent strategy. The proposed amendments show that many see through this concoction.

The amendments may offer more focus but lack credibility. One seeks to make next year’s election a “de facto referendum”. Even Sturgeon, its original proponent, has disowned the idea, though in her memoir makes out that this was all a misunderstanding rather than a blind alley.

Another proposes that an independence mandate must be “linked to more than 50 per cent of voters supporting the SNP, or other political parties and independent candidates, that support Scotland’s Right to Choose, on the regional list”. This highlights the historic tension between the SNP and the wider independence movement. It also taps into other old debates.

Back in the 1970s the SNP position was that the return of a majority of SNP MPs from Scotland constituted an independence mandate. Neil MacCormick, the late SNP constitutional thinker, maintained that a majority of voters was needed. The main problem with this latest iteration is that even if the SNP agreed, it would not have any legal or constitutional standing though it does have more credibility than John Swinney’s resolution.  Constitutional rules in a liberal democracy cannot be designed by one party alone.

A further amendment would add a reference to EU membership, which may appeal to activists but adds nothing of substance and continues to ignore the problems an independent Scotland in the EU would face if the rest of the UK remained outside.

There is the germ of a sensible proposition in the final amendment, though it would require rejection of the main resolution. It notes the need for answers to “credible, objective and impartial questions” on the benefits of independence. In order to do this, the SNP would need to abandon asserting the benefits of independence and engage honestly with the challenges and difficulties accompanying independence, not least now that Brexit has seriously undermined independence in Europe and the SNP has abandoned North Sea oil and gas-fuelled nationalism. This challenges the current SNP approach that borrows the Vote Leave approach to Brexit with wild unsubstantiated claims.

The SNP has taken to quoting Kenyon Wright from 1989, who asked: “What if that other voice we all know so well responds by saying, ‘We say no, and we are the state’? Well, we say yes – and we are the people.” Fine but vacuous rhetoric, as became clear when Westminster ignored the Constitutional Convention in the early 1990s – as indeed the SNP was wont to point out at the time.  The convention agreed a scheme of devolution but it was delivered by a Labour government.

The SNP debate will enthral many at the conference but the prospect of the internal constitutional wrangling spilling over into the next parliament may have less appeal to the wider electorate.